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This study aims to investigate the interplay of different criteria of moral evaluation, related
to the type of the rule and context characteristics, in moral reasoning of children, early,
and late adolescents. Students attending to fourth, seventh, and tenth grade were
asked to evaluate the acceptability of rule breaking actions using ad hoc scenarios.
Results suggest that the role of different moral evaluation criteria changes by age. During
adolescence a greater integration of the moral criteria emerged. Moreover, adolescents
also prioritized the evaluation of moral rule (forbidding to harm others) violations as
non-acceptable when the perpetrator harms an innocent victim by applying a direct
personal force. The relevance of these findings to increase the understanding of how
moral reasoning changes by age for the assessment of impairments in moral reasoning
of non-normative groups is also discussed.
Keywords: moral development, moral reasoning, decision making, social cognition, middle childhood,
adolescence, age-related differences, neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
One of the first neuropsychological studies of moral judgment and decision making led Greene
et al. (2004) to develop a Dual Process Theory to explain moral decision making. They highlight
that human beings can be driven by two distinct modes when they have to provide a behavioral
response to an environmental stimulus. The first mode is automatic, based on emotions, reflexes,
and intuition; the second is a deliberate mode, and it is useful when reasoned choices, and behaviors
based on a specified and detailed knowledge of the surrounding situation are needed. The latter
mode is conscious, based on specific rules and it requires more energy expenditure than the
first mode. Brain imaging studies reported by Greene et al. (2004) have shown and confirmed
that these two modes correspond to different neural activations. Specifically, automatic responses
are produced by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) while controlled and conscious
responses from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).
When discussing this Dual Process Theory of moral judgment, Greene et al. (2001) argued
that characteristically deontological judgments (i.e., judgments applied to rights, duties, etc.) are
supported by automatic and emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments
(which are based on cost-benefit reasoning) tend to be supported by conscious response under
the control of cognition (Greene, 2014).
According to some recent literature showing the relevance of the rule-based thinking for moral
judgments (Nichols et al., 2016; Ayars and Nichols, 2017), it is noteworthy to highlight that
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the processes involved in the deontological and utilitarian
evaluations may be influenced by the organization of the
knowledge about rules in distinct domains.Within the theoretical
framework of the Moral Domain Theory (Turiel, 1998) it has
been hypothesized that the moral knowledge is structured in
separate domains, which are mainly related to the distinction
between moral rules, aimed at preserving the other’s well-being
(e.g., the rules forbidding to hit or kill another person), and
socio-conventional rules, aimed at guaranteeing the order of
the social system (e.g., the school-based rule forbidding to call
the teacher by their first name). There is some evidence that
in people’s evaluations, violations of moral rules are usually
considered universally wrong, independently from the context
in which they happened and independently from any statement
that can be made by authorities. On the other side, violations
of socio-conventional rules are judged as less serious and less
punishable if compared to breaking moral rules, because the
value of socio-conventional rules is perceived to depend on
authorities’ statements (Smetana and Braeges, 1990).
The Dual Process Theory was inspired by the “trolley
problem,” a moral dilemma widely used for the study of moral
reasoning and decision making. The trolley problem describes
a situation where a runaway trolley threatens to kill several
persons if it proceeds on its present route. In the “switch”
(impersonal) version of the problem, a bystander can save those
persons by flipping a switch that will deviate the trolley to
an alternative track, where it will kill one person instead of
five. In the “footbridge” (personal) version of the dilemma, the
bystander stands next to a large stranger on a footbridge that
spans the trolley track, and can stop the trolley by pushing
the stranger off the bridge on the track below. When asked to
face the trolley problem, most people agree that the decision of
switching the trolley is acceptable (characteristically utilitarian
judgment), but they evaluate pushing the stranger off the bridge
as impermissible (characteristically deontological judgment), even
if in both the situations the behavior intentionally causes the
death of one person in order to save several people (Greene
et al., 2001; Nichols and Mallon, 2006; Bartels, 2008). The switch
problem and the footbridge problem are considered, respectively,
prototypical examples of impersonal and personal dilemmas.
The tendency to accept moral rule violations more easily when
they are presented in impersonal rather than in personal contexts
has been confirmed for all the versions of moral dilemmas that
have been developed based on the trolley problem. Moreover,
fMRI studies showed that brain areas related to emotions
were more activated while examining personal (including the
footbridge problem) than impersonal dilemmas (Greene et al.,
2004). Neuroscientific studies have also provided plenty evidence
that both adults and children tend to accept harming the
innocent victim much more when facing an impersonal situation
than a personal situation (Greene et al., 2001; Pellizzoni et al.,
2010; Greene, 2014). Nevertheless, the reason why personal
and impersonal dilemmas elicit activation of different neural
networks, and, even more interestingly, elicit different rates of
accepting moral violations is still unclear.
A first explanation has been based on the assumption that
the core criterion causing this difference in moral evaluations
consists in the presence (in personal dilemma contexts) or
absence (in the impersonal dilemma contexts) of the application
of a personal force between the actor and their sacrificial victim
(Greene et al., 2009). This explanation also implies that the
presence vs. absence of the application of a personal force, mainly
by means of a physical contact, elicits a different sense of harm
aversion due to reduced empathic concern for the victim (e.g.,
Hauser et al., 2007; Patil and Silani, 2014). Following this line
of reasoning, the presence of the application of a personal force
in the interaction between the actor and the victim may elicit
empathic feelings in the person evaluating the action, because
the proximity will foster a personal identification with the actor.
This explanation, however, fails to explain some of the research
results reported in other studies that used the original series
of dilemmas. These conflicting results lead to hypothesize that
other criteria are mixed with the personal force criterion (Greene
et al., 2001, 2009). In particular, the most relevant variable to
play an effect seems to be linked to the harm of the innocent
person being or not being the result of deflecting an existing
threat onto a different party. Therefore, there is still a need to
test the personal force criterion in a rigorous and controlled
way, in order to be able to clarify whether it can actually
be considered a main criterion influencing moral evaluations.
In order to do so, the experimental design should control all
confounding variables, by the way of having the presence or
absence of a personal force applied by the agent to the victim
as the only systematic variation distinguishing between personal
and impersonal contexts of the moral violations. Furthermore,
there is the need to test the personal force criterion by means of
dilemmas that, in comparison to the trolley dilemma, describe
situations closer to the everyday people’s experience, and that,
therefore, are more ecological.
A Model of the Possible Interplay of Moral
Evaluation Criteria
Within the debate on moral judgment in the utilitarian
framework of personal and impersonal situations, Nichols
and Mallon (2006) proposed that three factors play a role
in evaluating the permissibility of moral rule violations: (1)
cost/benefit analysis, (2) checking for rule violations and
prioritizing the rule value, and (3) emotional activation. When
deciding about acceptability of behaviors, people usually examine
costs and benefits for each line of actions and check whether
those actions break rules, in particular the moral rule that
forbids to harm others. Concerning the third factor, Nichols
and Mallon (2006) hypothesized that the features of the context
can elicit different levels of emotional activation that, in turn,
influence the two cognitive processes of cost/benefit analysis
and evaluation of the moral rule. Specifically, personal situations
would elicit higher emotional activation in comparison to
impersonal situations, because the application of personal force
by the perpetrator would prompt empathizing with the victim.
As a consequence, when personal situations are presented, the
evaluation of the action as respectful/transgressive of moral rules
becomes a priority above the cost-benefit analysis. On the other
hand, when the perpetrator’s action is performed in absence of
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the application of a personal force (i.e., impersonal context), in
the moral evaluations the consideration of how much the action
is beneficial predominates on checking for moral rule violations.
This model can help explaining why violations of moral rules can
be judged as admissible under some context conditions, and it
suggests that personal and impersonal dilemmas may provide a
critical test of the relative relevance and weight of the processes
involved in forming the decision to perform a social action
(Nichols and Mallon, 2006). When facing personal dilemmas,
we can expect that checking for rule violations is prompted by
the presence of the application of a personal force that is typical
of the perpetrator’s action and, therefore, that this process will
win over the cost/benefit analysis and lead to consider the action
as non-permissible. On the other hand, when presented with
impersonal dilemmas, in which the application of a personal
force in the perpetrator’s action is absent, the process of analyzing
the costs and benefits of the action becomes prominent and lead
to evaluate harming others as acceptable.
Developmental Differences in Moral
Evaluations
Up to now, the research within the framework of the Dual
Process Theory has been focusing mainly on the assessments of
moral violations in personal and impersonal dilemmas based on
the trolley problem presented above and using adult samples.
More research involving different age-groups and based on more
ecological situations is still needed.
To our knowledge, only few studies focused on children
(Pellizzoni et al., 2010; Caravita et al., 2012; Powell et al., 2012;
Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni and Surian, 2017). In three
experiments focusing on preschoolers’ evaluations of the trolley
problem (Pellizzoni et al., 2010), most of 3- to 5-year old
children judged as a right choice to hurt one person in order
to save five, but only when it did not require the agent to have
a physical contact with the victim (the switch version of the
dilemma), thus resembling adults’ answers. Accordingly, Powell
et al. (2012) found that children aged 5–6 and 7–8 years, when
facing situations that mirrored the personal and the impersonal
dilemmas, produced evaluations similar to adults’ ones.
Nevertheless, assuming an adult model of moral reasoning as
a universal model could potentially be misleading, and hence
investigating better possible changes in the weight of different
criteria in determiningmoral evaluations has been recommended
(Nichols and Mallon, 2006). In order to achieve this goal, we
need (1) to further explore possible age-related differences in the
dual process moral reasoning by comparing different age-groups,
and (2) to consider a greater number of personal and impersonal
situations, which should be more ecological.
When focusing on the rule-based thinking, studies designed
within the framework of the moral domain theory have
investigated this process from a developmental perspective.
Within this perspective, the research has provided evidence that
by the early age of 34 months children are able to distinguish
between basic moral and socio-conventional events. By 42
months of age children are also able to judge a moral violation
as more serious and non-admissible than a socio-conventional
violation, and they perceive the violation of the moral as wrong
independently of authorities’ statements and rule contingency
(Smetana and Braeges, 1990). Starting at the age of 3 years,
children are also aware of the consequences of actions, and
they judge behaviors that break moral rules as wrong because
intrinsically unfair (Helwig et al., 2001).
Within this line of research, most of the existing studies
have focused on preschoolers. Nevertheless, the little research
involving older samples of children and early adolescents has
provided evidence that the ability of distinguishing between
domains continues to increase by age (Glassman and Zan,
1995). Younger children have been found to consider moral
rules as dependent on authority’s statements (thus, as socio-
conventional) at a larger extent than older children do (Caravita
et al., 2009; Gasser and Keller, 2009), and, when evaluating a
behavior in situations of mixed domains, preschoolers and first
graders tend to evaluate these behavior as socio-conventional
more than third graders do (Crane and Tisak, 1995).
Age-related changes within the general domain structure,
however, need to be further explored by considering a larger
range of situations. Indeed, most of the existing studies focused
on events where the target transgressive action involved only
physical harm (Smetana, 2006) and studies on the moral domain
distinction during late-childhood (8–9 years) and adolescence,
that is, the age periods that are traditionally assumed as critical for
the development of rule socio-conventionality (Kohlberg, 1981;
for a review, Killen and Smetana, 2006), are scarce.
The Present Study
The first goal of this study is exploring how children and
adolescents, when engaged in moral reasoning, use the criteria
of moral judgment that the Dual Process Theory individuates
as relevant for the moral evaluations. We mainly focused on
the contribution of rule-based thinking, as conceptualized in the
framework of the moral domain theory, toward reasoning about
moral dilemmas. For this purpose, we referred to the model
proposed by Nichols and Mallon (2006). This model provides
a possible interpretative hypothesis of how the contextual
dimension of the presence/absence of a personal force applied by
the agent in harming the victim may influence the evaluation of
the acceptability of moral rules violations within an utilitarian
framework. We hypothesize that the evaluation of moral rule
violations as acceptable is more strongly associated to accepting
to harm a person in order to benefit others in impersonal than in
personal situations. This derives from the assumption that when
personal situations are presented, the application of a personal
force by the agent in harming the victim prioritizes the respect
of moral rules (forbidding to harm others) over the cost/benefit
analysis. In contrast, in impersonal situations, where there is
no application of personal force by the agent, the cost-benefit
analysis often prevails over the respect of moral rules, and the
moral rule violation is more easily accepted.
The second purpose of the study is exploring age-related
differences in how children and adolescents integrate the moral
evaluation criteria that were individuated by the Dual Process
Theory and by the moral domain theory (adopted as theoretical
model of how the rule-based thinking is organized). This
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would foster a better understanding of how different criteria of
evaluation interact, and affect moral decision making at different
ages, within the normative population. This information may
foster a better understanding of how moral reasoning develops,
and help to better identify possible impairments in non-
normative groups. To achieve this goal, we compared three age
levels that are considered to be critical for the development of rule
understanding and moral reasoning (Killen and Smetana, 2006):
a sample of 8–9 year children to 12–13 years early-adolescents
and to 15–16 years adolescents. As far as moral reasoning in
personal/impersonal contexts is concerned, we hypothesize that
all 3 age groups will accept moral violations more easily in
impersonal rather than personal situations, reflecting a universal
trend. Assuming a developmental perspective, a task coherent
with the domain theory (Loureno, 2014) would have been the
most appropriate to use. To achieve this goal, an ecologically valid
battery of moral dilemmas, suitable for the target population, was
developed.
Because this is the first study assuming that the rule-based
thinking is organized in different domains and exploring how
this form of thinking works in association with the cost-
benefit analysis in different age-groups, we can only formulate
preliminary hypotheses about age-related differences in the
associations between evaluation criteria in judging violations of
moral vs. socio-conventional rules, and violations of the moral
rules in personal vs. impersonal contexts. We hypothesize that
the integration between evaluations of violations of both moral
and socio-conventional rules and of moral rule violations in
personal and impersonal contexts increases by age, because of the
development of cognitive processes.
METHODS
Participants
The study involved 226 students attending two primary schools,
two middle schools, and two high schools in the areas of Milan
and Brescia, two of the largest cities in Northern Italy. At the
time of the data collection, 81 participants were in fourth grade
(primary school group: 59.3% boys;M = 8.98 years; SD = 0.39),
72 were in seventh grade (middle school group: 55.6%% boys;
M = 12.14 years; SD = 0.61), and 73 were in tenth grade (high
school group: 52.1%% boys; M = 15.10 years; SD =0.38). Most
(81.9 %) participants were born in Italy and of Italian lineage.
Information on the SES of participants’ families was collected
by asking participants to report their parents or legal caregivers’
qualifications and jobs. Only 2 participants (0.9%) were not able
to provide this information. Twenty-one percent resulted of low-
middle SES, 56.3% of middle SES, and 22.8% of middle-high
SES.
Measures
Moral vs. Socio-Conventional Domains
A specific measure was used to evaluate domain attribution to
rules and acceptance of social violations based on distinguishing
between moral and socio-conventional domains. The assessment
tool (Caravita et al., 2012) was composed by 21 items, consisting
in short stories where a moral school rule was broken, and 20
items in which a socio-conventional school rule was violated. All
the items required the respondent to assume the perspective of
the character breaking the rule. In half of the scenarios characters
were girls and in half boys. Two versions of the measure were
created: one for children and one for early-adolescents and
adolescents. The two versions were equivalent for the content,
the word number, and the grammar structure of the items. They
differed only for contextual factors, which were related to primary
school in the children version and to secondary school in the
adolescent version (in the Italian school system middle and high
school share the same main contextual characteristics). After
each item was presented, the respondent was asked to judge
whether the main character’s behavior in that situation was right
(acceptability of rule violations). Samples items are displayed in
Table 1.
For both moral and socio-conventional scenarios, the total
score of the acceptability of rule violation is computed as the
sum of the item scores. Reliability of scores (Cronbach’s alpha)
was from acceptable to good for the children version (moral
rule scenarios 0.67; socio-conventional rule scenarios 0.83) and
good for the adolescent version (moral rule scenarios 0.91; socio-
conventional rule scenarios 0.90).
Personal vs. Impersonal Moral Dilemmas
Eight couples of impersonal and personal dilemmas, that
is, 16 dilemmas altogether, to be administered to primary
school children, and a corresponding series of dilemmas to be
administered to elder students were used (Caravita et al., 2012).
The characters acting in the dilemmas were all children, girls in
half of the dilemmas and boys in the second half. Each dilemma
presented a scenario where a “helpmate,” in order to produce
a benefit to another child, has to act so that a harm, a loss, or
a disadvantage affects a third child (henceforth the “victimized
child”). For each of the eight scenarios there was an impersonal
and a personal version. Being the contextual information the
same, in impersonal scenarios there was no physical contact
between the helpmate and the victimized child, that is, the
helpmate did not interact face to face with the victim; In
personal scenarios the helpmate touched, looked at, and/or spoke
to the victimized child. Presence/absence of physical contact
between the helpmate and the victimized child was the unique,
unequivocal criterion that distinguished between the personal
and the impersonal dilemma versions and possible confounding
variables were discarded (Antonietti, 2011).
Focusing on formal features, dilemmas consisted of short
stories, easy to be understood, not involving the knowledge of
specific social norms, not describing dramatic and emotionally
impressive situations. The victimized child was always unaware
of the situation (otherwise she/he might decide to sacrifice her-
/himself) and could not avoid being involved in the action carried
out by the helpmate. The helpmate could not sacrifice her-
/himself instead of the victimized child. The action performed by
the helpmate always had a certain outcome. The helpmate took
no direct advantage or damage as a consequence of her/his action.
Two series of dilemmas were prepared for children (i.e.,
the primary school students) and for adolescents. The two
series only differed from each other for situation details, which
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TABLE 1 | Examples of moral and socio-conventional scenarios.
Condition Moral scenario Socio-conventional scenario
Text description In your school there is a rule that you must not take other
children’s things. A day at school you are in the cafeteria and
you force John to give you his lunch and then you eat it.
(Primary school scenario)
In your school there is the rule that children must stand up when
an adult enters the classroom. One morning a janitress enters
into the classroom and you don’t stand up because you are
drawing. (Middle school scenario)
In your school there is a rule forbidding to leave the books out of
the personal lockers, at the end of the lessons. One morning,
you are in a hurry to leave school and you abandon your history
book on your desk. (High school scenario)
Acceptability of rule violations Is it right to do so? (Yes = 1; No = 0)
Each scenario was followed by a question on the Acceptability of rule violation.
matched what usually occurs in everyday-life school experiences
of, respectively, children and elder youths. Examples of pairs of
dilemmas are displayed in Table 2.
Each dilemma ended with the question: “Is it right to
do so?” (Yes = 1; No = 0). Total scores of personal and
impersonal dilemmas were the sum of dilemma responses,
with higher scores corresponding to accepting hurting the
victimized child. Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the sub-series
of dilemmas was acceptable in both the versions, but better
for the adolescent version (personal dilemmas 0.70; impersonal
dilemmas 0.72) than for the children version (personal dilemmas
0.55; impersonal dilemmas 0.50).
Procedure
A broader study was carried out in collaboration with the
rehabilitation center IRCCS “Eugenio Medea” (Bosisio Parini,
Italy), in order to include atypically developing participants. The
ethical committee of the IRCCS “Eugenio Medea” approved the
whole research project, including the current study, which only
involved typically developing participants. Written informed
consent for all participants was collected in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Personal and impersonal dilemmas were mixed and then
divided into two sequences so that the personal and impersonal
versions of the same dilemma were not included in the same
sequence. The moral and socio-conventional scenarios were
mixed as well and then organized in two sequences. The four
sequences were then alternated and their order was reversed,
thus obtaining two administration protocols. Protocol 1 started
with one of the two sequences of moral and socio-conventional
stories, whereas in protocol 2 the starting sequence was one
of the two dilemma sequences. In each school-level half of
the classes answered the protocol 1 and the other half the
protocol 2.
Measures were group-administered in participants’
classrooms during normal school time in a single session
(approximately 90min). A research assistant supervised the
administration, gave information about filling out the measures,
answered participants’ questions, and in primary school classes
read aloud each item of the measures, giving the children enough
time to answer. Class participation was authorized by principals
and committees of teachers. Participants’ parents (or legal
guardians) were informed of the study aims and procedure by
means of a letter that was sent by the schools. Parents actively
consented the children’s participation by signing the consent
form attached to the letter. At the beginning of the session,
participants were informed about the aims of the research
project and their right to withdraw from the study at any time,
and were asked for a verbal consent to their participation. Only 5
students (2.19% of the sample) were not allowed to participate in
the study.
RESULTS
Associations of Moral Components
Correlations (Pearson’s r) of the moral evaluation criteria for the
overall sample are reported in Table 3.
Accepting the moral rule violation in personal and impersonal
contexts was positively associated with judging rule violations
as acceptable for both moral and socio-conventional rules.
Correlations in the separate age groups are reported in Table 4.
Among children the levels of acceptability of violations
of moral and socio-conventional rules were highly positively
associated to each other. The same was true for accepting
the moral rule violations in personal and impersonal contexts.
However, the acceptance of harming a person in both personal
and impersonal contexts was connected to the acceptance of
violations of socio-conventional rules but not of moral rules.
Among early adolescents, accepting rule violations in both
the domains was positively correlated with accepting to harm
others in impersonal and personal contexts, but the correlation
was stronger for the impersonal than the personal dilemmas.
These differences in the strength of the correlation indices
were significant at the Steiger’s z test: correlations of accepting
breaking moral rules with personal/impersonal scenarios, z =
−2.906, p < 0.01; correlations of accepting breaking socio-
conventional rules with personal/impersonal scenarios, z =
−2.115, p < 0.05. Also, among adolescents, accepting violation
of both moral and socio-conventional rules was more strongly
associated with accepting to harm others in impersonal than
in personal contexts, but these differences in the strength
of the associations were not significant at the Steiger’s z-test
(moral rules: z = −1.365, ns; socio-conventional rules: z =
−0.394, ns).
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TABLE 2 | Examples of personal and impersonal scenarios.
Condition Personal scenario Impersonal scenario
Text description Dario is tumbling down the stairs. Alberto is in front of you at
the bottom of the stairs. You push Alberto so that he falls on
his knees and stops the fall of Dario, and Dario does not hurt
himself too much. (Primary, Middle and High school)
Andrea is tumbling down the stairs. Luca is in front of you. You
pushes a pile of paper boxes that is on the stairs so that they can
stop Andrea’s falling, even if they knock Luca down too. (Primary,
Middle and High school).
Acceptability of rule violations Is it right to do so? (Yes = 1; No = 0)
Each scenario was followed by a question on the Acceptability of rule violation.
TABLE 3 | Overall sample: Correlations of moral evaluation criteria
(acceptability of the rule violations).
1. 2. 3. 4.
1.Moral rules –
2.Socio-conv. Rules 0.72*** –
3.Personal context 0.32*** 0.37*** –
4.Impersonal context 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.60*** –
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 4 | Correlations of moral evaluation criteria (acceptability of the
rule violations) in the separate age-groups.
1. 2. 3. 4.
CHILDREN
1.Moral rules –
2.Socio-conv. rules 0.63*** –
3.Personal context 0.19 0.35** –
4.Impersonal context 0.15 0.30** 0.54*** –
EARLY ADOLESCENTS
1.Moral rules –
2. Socio-conv. rules 0.74*** –
3.Personal context 0.27* 0.39*** –
4.Impersonal context 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.73*** –
ADOLESCENTS
1.Moral rules –
2. Socio-conv. rules 0.69*** –
3.Personal context 0.46*** 0.44*** –
4.Impersonal context 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.51*** –
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Age-Related Trends of Moral Evaluation
Criteria
In order to investigate age-related trends, data were first
analyzed by performing repeated-measure Analyses of Variance
(ANOVA) by assuming scores in the series of moral vs.
socio-conventional rule scenarios and personal vs. impersonal
dilemmas as dependent variables, type of the rule/context as
within-subject factor, and age-group and gender as between-
subject independent variables. Two separate ANOVAs (Tables 5,
6) were, therefore, carried out: one for acceptability of
violations of moral and socio-conventional rules and one for
personal/impersonal contexts.
Concerning the acceptability of rule violations in moral vs.
socio-conventional scenarios, main effects of gender, type of
rule, age-group, and the interaction effect of type of rule X age-
group emerged. Girls evaluated rules as less breakable than boys.
Acceptance of rule violations increased by age. Violations of rules
were evaluated as less acceptable for moral rules than socio-
conventional rules by all participants. However, the difference
in scores between moral and socio-conventional rules gradually
increased across age-groups (Figure 1). Univariate ANOVAs
performed in order to better investigate the interaction effect of
type of rule X age-group showed that scores for accepting the
rule violations were lower for the moral rules than for the socio-
conventional rules in all the three age-groups [Children: F(1, 79)
= 27.71, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26; Early adolescents: F(1, 71) = 33.98,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.32; Adolescents: F(1, 72) = 83.94, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.54]. The three age-groups differed from each other in
reference to both moral [F(2, 222) = 10.75, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.09]
and socio-conventional rules [F(2, 222) = 25.78, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.19]. Yet, at the Student-Newmann-Keuls post hoc test, the
scores of the 3 age-groups were all significantly different from
each other for the socio-conventional rule violations, but not for
the moral rule violations. Concerning the moral rule violations,
only the subsample of children scored significantly lower than
early adolescents and adolescents.
When considering personal vs. impersonal contexts, the main
effect of the type of context was statistically significant, with lower
scores for personal as compared to impersonal dilemmas. Gender
also had a significant main effect, with girls scoring lower than
boys. No significant effects by the age group emerged.
Effects of the Context on Accepting Moral
Rule Violations
We referred to the Nichols and Mallon’s Model by investigating
the hypothesis that the evaluation of moral rules as non-
breakable is less influential on accepting the harming actions
in impersonal contexts than in personal contexts. This would
happen because perceiving moral rule as non-breakable is
hypothesized to be less prioritized on the cost-benefit analysis
in impersonal situations than in personal situations (Nichols and
Mallon, 2006). This means that accepting the violations of moral
rules should be more strongly associated with harming another
person in impersonal than in personal contexts.
To test this hypothesis, we performed a repeated measure
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) with scores of personal vs.
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TABLE 5 | Means, standard deviations of moral and socio-conventional
rule scenarios, and indexes of the ANOVAs tests.
Moral rule
Scenario
Socio-conv. Rule
Scenario
M SD M SD
Children 0.46 1.09 1.70 2.62
Boys 0.64 1.31 2.00 2.90
Girls 0.21 0.60 1.27 2.11
Early adolescents 2.00 3.56 4.36 5.08
Boys 2.38 3.64 4.75 5.07
Girls 1.53 3.45 3.88 5.12
Adolescents 2.71 3.93 6.80 5.15
Boys 3.89 4.38 7.68 5.37
Girls 1.43 2.93 5.83 4.78
Total 1.68 3.21 4.20 4.85
Boys 2.18 3.51 4.61 5.03
Girls 1.06 2.67 3.70 4.59
Type of rule/context F (1, 219) 142.23***, η
2
= 0.394
Age-groups F (2, 219) 22.23***, η
2
= 0.169
Gender F (1, 219) 6.89**, η
2
= 0.030
Type of rule/context X Age F (2, 219) 15.53***, η
2
= 0.124
Type of rule/context X Gender F (1,219) 0.05 ns, η
2
= 0.000
Age X Gender F (1, 219) 1.14 ns, η
2
= 0.010
Type of rule/context X Age X Gender F (2,219) 0.40 ns, η
2
= 0.004
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
impersonal dilemmas as a within-subject factor. The acceptability
of violations of moral rules was specified as a covariate. The
expectation was to find a significant interaction effect of the type
of dilemma by the acceptability of the moral rule violations.
According with our hypothesis, the acceptability of the moral
rule violation not only affected scores through the dilemmas
[F(1, 209) = 47.28, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.18], but also its interaction
effect by the type of dilemma was significant [F(1, 209) = 15.28,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.07]. To better examine the interaction effect,
follow-up regressions were performed: Scores of personal and
impersonal dilemmas were specified as the criterion variables
and the acceptability of the moral rule violations as the predictor
variable.
As hypothesized, the acceptability of the moral rule violations
explained a significant portion of variance of scores of both
personal [R2 = 0.10, F(1, 215) = 24.57, p < 0.001] and impersonal
dilemmas [R2 = 0.22, F(1, 215) = 60.74, p < 0.001], but its
association with the dilemmas score was stronger for the
impersonal [β = 0.47, p < 0.001] than for the personal contexts
[β= 0.32, p < 0.001].
In order to explore whether this interplay of the variables
changes by age, the ANCOVA test was carried out separately
within each age-group. Among children, both the main effect of
the acceptability of violations of moral rules and its interaction
effect by the type of context were not significant [respectively:
F(1, 73) = 2.43, ns; F(1, 73) = 0.09, ns]. Among both early
adolescents and adolescents, the main effect of the acceptability
of moral rule violation was significant [Early adolescents: F(1, 64)
TABLE 6 | Means, standard deviations of the personal and impersonal
scenarios, and indexes of the ANOVAs tests.
Personal context Impersonal context
M SD M SD
Children 1.60 1.42 2.23 1.60
Boys 1.71 1.44 2.56 1.62
Girls 1.43 1.41 1.73 1.46
Early adolescents 2.02 1.63 2.68 1.87
Boys 2.32 1.58 3.05 1.86
Girls 1.61 1.64 2.18 1.81
Adolescents 1.79 1.45 2.53 1.78
Boys 2.14 1.38 2.64 1.82
Girls 1.41 1.46 2.41 1.74
Total 1.79 1.50 2.47 1.75
Boys 2.03 1.48 2.74 1.76
Girls 1.48 1.49 2.12 1.68
Type of rule/context F (1, 219) 41.51***, η
2
= 0.168
Age-groups F (2, 219) 1.63 ns, η
2
= 0.016
Gender F (1, 219) 9.25**, η
2
= 0.043
Type of rule/context X Age F (2, 219) 0.26 ns, η
2
= 0.003
Type of rule/context X Gender F (1, 219) 0.12 ns, η
2
= 0.001
Age X Gender F (1, 219) 0.22 ns, η
2
= 0.002
Type of rule/context X Age X Gender F (2, 219) 2.29 ns, η
2
= 0.022
*p < 0.05,**p < 0.01,***p < 0.001.
= 10.96, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.15; Adolescents: F(1,68) = 40.50, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.37], and the interaction effect of type of context
X acceptability of moral rule violation as well [Early adolescents:
F(1, 64) = 21.09, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.25; Adolescents: F(1, 68) = 4.18,
p< 0.05, η2 = 0.06]. The follow-up regressions confirmed that in
both the age-groups the acceptability of the moral rule violations
was associated with accepting to harm a person more strongly in
impersonal [Early adolescents: R2 = 0.25, F(1, 65) = 22.16, p <
0.001, β = 0.50 p < 0.05; Adolescents: R2 = 0.35, F(1,68) = 37.39,
p < 0.001, β = 0.59 p < 0.001] than in personal dilemmas [Early
adolescents: R2 = 0.08, F(1, 65) = 5.56, p< 0.05, β= 0.27 p< 0.05;
Adolescents: R2 = 0.25, F(1, 68) = 17.90, p < 0.001, β = 0.46 p <
0.001].
As a further test of Nichols and Mallon’s Model, we also
performed an ANCOVA with scores of personal vs. impersonal
dilemmas as a within-subject factor and the acceptability of
violations of socio-conventional rules as a covariate. Since
personal and impersonal dilemmas describe mainly situations in
which moral rather than socio-conventional rules are broken,
we can expect that the interaction effect of accepting socio-
conventional rule violations with personal vs. impersonal
contexts is lower, as compared to the interaction effect of
accepting moral rule violations, or non-significant. We tested
the ANCOVA separately for the three age groups, since the
age level already showed to buffer these effects in the previous
analyses. Among children and adolescents the interaction effect
of the acceptability of socio-conventional rule violations with
type of the dilemma was non-significant [children: F(1, 73) =
0.05, ns; adolescents: F(1, 68) = 1.12, ns]. Among early adolescents
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 597
Caravita et al. Moral Reasoning and Age-Related Trends
FIGURE 1 | Mean scores of the 3 age-groups for acceptability of moral
and socio-conventional rule violations.
the interaction effect of acceptability of socio-conventional rule
violations with type of the context was significant [F(1, 64) = 8.91,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.12], even if lower than the interaction effect of
accepting moral rule violation in the same age group. Likewise
acceptability of moral rule violations, in follow-up regression the
acceptability of socio-conventional rule violations was associated
more strongly with harming the victimized child in impersonal
contexts [R2 = 0.15, F(1, 65) = 28.41, p < 0.001, β = 0.55 p <
0.001] than in personal contexts [R2 = 0.30, F(1, 69) = 12.12, p =
0.001, β= 0.39 p= 0.001].
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The first goal of this study was exploring the possible interplay
of criteria of moral evaluations reflecting the organization of
moral knowledge in domains related to types of rules, and
the evaluations of moral violations in personal and impersonal
contexts as proposed in the Dual Process Theory (Greene et al.,
2004). We assumed the model proposed by Nichols and Mallon
(2006) as a possible interpretative hypothesis to understand
this interplay. Our second goal was exploring whether the
associations of moral evaluation criteria and their interplay
in judgments change by age. Possible moderation by age was
examined by considering three separate age groups: children,
early adolescents, and adolescents.
As far as the first goal is concerned, correlation indexes
showed that judging rule violations as acceptable was associated
to evaluating harming another person as possible in order to help
a third one. This association was stronger for impersonal than
personal contexts. The result was significant for the all sample,
even if it was more distinctive for the two adolescents groups.
These data provide a first confirmation of the potential relevance
of context characteristics in prioritizing the check of coherence
between evaluations of the behavior and the respect of moral
rules over the analysis of costs and benefits per se (the model
by Nichols and Mallon, 2006). The tendency to permit moral
rule violations was associated to accepting the harm of others,
if this provides a possible benefit. This association was weaker in
the personal contexts, which were characterized by the presence
of a personal force applied by the agent in harming the victim,
than in the impersonal contexts. Furthermore, the tendency
to allow violations of socio-conventional rules had either non-
significant or, in comparison to the acceptability of moral rule
violations, weaker interaction effect with the presence/absence
of the application of personal force by the agents. This result
provides some evidence that it is the judgment about moral rules,
but not the judgment about socio-conventional rules, that, in
moral evaluations, is influenced by these context characteristics,
and, hence, it supports the relevance of the rule-based thinking
for moral judgements. Therefore, Nichols and Mallon’s model
that focuses on how different judgment criteria, related to
context dimensions and types of rules, interact in influencing
the moral evaluations, seems to provide an adequate perspective
to better understand how different moral criteria play a role
in the moral decision making. This may subsequently foster a
clearer understanding of the organization of moral knowledge
and reasoning.
An interesting and possibly controversial finding is the
positive correlation that emerged between violation of socio-
conventional rules and permissibility of harm in impersonal
and personal moral dilemmas. It is easy to see that disregard
for moral rules can lead to acceptance of harm for the greater
good, but it is less clear why disregard for conventional rules is
associated with utilitarian moral judgments. What all of these
judgments share is the common determination of norm violation.
So someone could argue that what our results track using moral
domain task is the propensity to abide by norms and this is what
is actually predictive of norm violation in a different context.
Some evidence from literature may help explaining this specific
result. Huebner et al. (2009), exploring the role of emotions in
moral evaluations, hypothesize that a fast, unconscious process
that operates over causal-intentional representations mediates
our moral judgments. Such a fast and unconscious mechanism
would clearly explain our results, since it would elicit an answer
before the distinction between moral and socio-conventional
rules has been fully processed at a cognitive level, pertaining the
reading of it to the moral domain and not to a general response
to norms.
Age-Related Trends in Moral Evaluations
The distinction between moral domains has been found
to increase with age. Coherently with our hypotheses, the
understanding of socio-conventional rules as more breakable
than moral rules was higher among early adolescents than
children, and among adolescents than among younger age
groups. Overall, the picture emerging from our data is in line
with the traditional view of a gradual improvement, across
adolescent years, of the comprehension of the nature of rules
and of socio-conventional rules as changeable and based on the
social agreement (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981). Accordingly, adolescents
become progressively more able to understand the nature of
the rules and tend to evaluate the rule violations as more
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acceptable for the socio-conventional rules than for the moral
rules. Nevertheless, surprisingly, primary school children judged
moral rules as significantly less breakable than older youngsters.
The expectation would have been that the age-level was not
influential on the judgment of moral rule violations as not
acceptable. However, it should be noted that the size of these
two effects was low (0.09 and 0.02) and that this outcome may
reflect a view of rules, independent of the type, which is overall
more rigid for children than for adolescents. In accordance
with this interpretation, children showed the lowest differences
in accepting moral and socio-conventional rule violations and
revealed a less undifferentiated comprehension of norms.
As we hypothesized, and consistent with previous literature
involving other age samples (Pellizzoni et al., 2010), comparing
the personal and the impersonal dilemmas, children and
adolescents showed the same tendency, already found in adults,
to consider harming another person as acceptable more easily
in contexts where the agent’s application of personal force in
harming the victim is absent than in contexts entailing this
personal force. It is important to highlight that this tendency
emerged in this study using scenarios that were more ecological
than the original trolley problem. The apparent universality
of this behavior gives some support to theories assuming the
existence of an innate moral sense (Sachdeva et al., 2011), or, at
least, an innate set of parameters for building morality (Hauser,
2006). Assuming that personal contexts are associated to higher
activation of emotion-related brain areas than the impersonal
contexts are (Greene et al., 2001), we can hypothesize that
emotions may be one of the innate tools for moral intuitions and
judgments (Haidt, 2001). This is coherent with the idea that the
early distinction between moral and socio-conventional domains
is grounded in empathy (Helwig, 2008). Empathic emotions
may establish the value of moral rules and the emotional
activation elicited by the application of personal force by the
harm perpetrator maymake the concordance between action and
moral rules a priority (Nichols and Mallon, 2006).
When exploring possible age-related differences in the
interplay of criteria influencing moral evaluations, the
correlation indexes showed that the associations between
accepting violations across the four situations increased with
age. This outcome suggests an increase of coherence in moral
judgment with age, probably reflecting the development of
cognitive skills linked to moral reasoning that leads to a more
integrated functioning. Accordingly, we found support for
Nichols and Mallon’s model among early adolescents and
adolescents, that is, the two age groups that were expected to
show the strongest integration in moral reasoning, but not
among children. Similarly, Powell et al. (2012) found that
children (5–6 years old) integrated less the cost/benefit analysis
in their justifications for allowing harming a person in order to
save five than older children (aged 7–8 years) did. We can hence
assume that the ability to consider more evaluation criteria in
moral situations is likely to increase and to show higher levels
of integration with age. These findings and the outcomes on
age-related differences for the domain structure emerging from
the exam of correlations and ANCOVAs highlight the need
to further investigate the relations among different evaluation
criteria in moral decision making, and the underlying structure
of morality. These criteria potentially influence the moral
reasoning to a different extent across different age groups.
This interpretation agrees with the literature suggesting that
at different ages young people attribute different weights to
specific dimensions (such as agent’s intention and the respect
of the rule) when producing moral evaluations (Helwig et al.,
2001), and supports the relevance of exploring how these
criteria, studied in different traditions of research, interact and
change their interplay according to the child’s development. This
investigation can provide a better understanding of how moral
reasoning changes within the normative population by age, and,
subsequently, can provide relevant reference points to evaluate
moral reasoning skills and development in non-normative
groups of different age.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are some limitations in this study. First, the collected
data were only cross-sectional. Therefore, we could investigate
developmental differences in the organization of moral reasoning
only by comparing different age groups. Furthermore, we did
not explore the role of emotions in influencing moral reasoning.
Hence, we could only hypothesize that differences in emotional
activation and emotional response can be also influential on
the different weight attributed to different moral evaluation
criteria, which are related to specific context characteristics.
Future studies can further investigate the possible role played
by cultural differences. Literature on this specific topic offers
mixed results (Tang and Tang, 2016). On one hand, some form
of a “generalized ethic,” only marginally influenced by culture,
has been reported. For instance, Mann et al. (2016) showed that
dishonesty is limited in magnitude and similar across countries
and it is not associated to cultural values. Moreover, Kwan
(2016) observed that both American and Chinese participants
disapproved the infringement of intellectual property rights
to a similar extent and expressed the same level of anger in
response to to such a violation. On the other hand, by contrast,
cultural factors, as argued by Graham et al. (2016) in their
review of the literature, appear to influence moral judgments
and moral behaviors, since differences in morality occur not only
across societies, but also within the same national context, when
comparing inter-societal subgroups. Sychev et al. (2016) found
that, according to self-report measures of morality, Mongolian
and Russian adolescents share conservative moral foundations,
whereas German adolescents exhibit more progressive moral
foundations.
With specific reference to moral dilemmas, Arutyunova et al.
(2016) proposed tasks similar to the trolley problem, both
involving and not involving personal contacts, via Web to a large
sample of North American and British people in comparison to
Russian participants. They found cultural differences only in the
male subsample, with men fromWestern cultures resulting more
utilitarian than Russian men. Focusing on children, Michelin
et al. (2010), by using a version of the trolley problems that
was adapted for children, reported that in a sample of Italian
mono-lingual children the preference for an utilitarian criterion
(namely, saving more persons) did not emerge until the age
of 6 years. Instead, 4 and 5-year children with a Slovenian-
Italian linguistic and cultural background applied such a criterion
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even in the personal condition. The distinct effect of culture
and language should be disentangled, as stressed by the study
conducted by Chan et al. (2016), where participants made
more utilitarian choices in the Footbridge dilemma when it was
presented in a foreign language than in their native language.
As further limitation, the current study only focused on
hypothetical judgments. Nevertheless, the actual behavioral
responses may change in more realistic contexts, as found
in some previuos studies (Patil et al., 2014; Francis et al.,
2016). Lastly, reliability of the series of personal and impersonal
dilemmas was acceptable but only moderate among children.
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are several novelties
in this study. This is one of the first studies exploring the
relations between different moral evaluation criteria, and the
related organization of moral knowledge in domains and of
moral reasoning factors related to specific contextual facets.
Moreover, this study is one of the first attempts to join lines of
research on moral reasoning that are usually separate in other
studies. The value of linking different study traditions has been
highlighted as a future promising direction of research (Killen
and Smetana, 2008). From the same perspective, we need further
research projects exploring from a developmental perspective the
interplay of different moral criteria, emotions, and cognition in
determining moral evaluations, and the actual moral behavior
in the normative population, in order to be able to gain a
better understanding of possible impairments and deficits in
moral reasoning of non-normative groups, such as children or
adolescents with traumatic brain injury (Beauchamp et al., 2013).
As a third novelty of this study, this research project is one
of the few studies testing the universality of the distinction
between moral judgements for personal and impersonal contexts
in non-adult groups and, to our knowledge, this is the first study
performing this test using three separate age groups: children,
early adolescents, and adolescents.
As a last strength of this study, we used ecological scenarios
to test differences between personal and impersonal contexts,
and assessed moral domain features using a large selection
of scenarios. This research approach can be promising for
improving our understanding of the architecture of morality and
of its development with age.
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